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Abstract
We draw on within-state variations in the reach of capital punishment statutes between 1977 and 2004
to identify the deterrent effects associated with capital eligibility. Focusing on the most prevalent
eligibility expansion, we estimate that the adoption of a child murder factor is associated with an
approximately 20% reduction in the homicide rate of youth victims. Eligibility expansions may enhance
deterrence by (1) paving the way for more executions and (2) providing prosecutors with greater
leverage to secure enhanced non-capital sentences. While executions themselves are rare, this latter
channel is likely to be triggered fairly regularly, providing a reasonable basis for a general deterrent
response.
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I.

Introduction

Capital punishment has long been one of the most controversial topics in the political and moral
discourse of the United States. The death penalty debate persists on numerous fronts today, as
legislatures and courts continue to evaluate the general propriety of capital punishment, along with the
propriety of its specific components (e.g., execution methods). In 2007, the New Jersey legislature even
went so far as to repeal its death penalty statute entirely. New Mexico has recently followed suit.
Those who continue to support the death penalty identify its potential to deter future homicides as a
principal justification for its application. The existence of a deterrent effect itself, however, remains a
controversial subject. An extensive empirical literature has attempted to estimate the association
between homicide rates and the use of capital punishment. The literature to date, however, has
presented a set of largely mixed and uncertain results.
In this paper, we take up this empirical task and estimate certain deterrent forces associated
with capital punishment using a novel source of variation in death penalty legislation: the within-state
expansion of capital-eligibility factors over time. In accordance with relevant Supreme Court doctrine,
states emerged from the 1970’s death penalty moratorium by enacting statutes that restricted the
application of capital punishment to homicides that meet certain delineated characteristics. Since the
post-moratorium reinstatements, virtually every state has periodically added to its list of eligibility
criteria. Studies that use variation in death penalty laws to test for deterrence generally focus on the
extensive margin: does the relevant state have a death penalty statute in effect? We are aware of no
study that has explored variations along the intensive margin attributable to within-state eligibility
expansions.
We focus our deterrence analysis on a relatively targeted investigation into the relationship
between child murder eligibility provisions and child murder rates, derived using incident-level homicide
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data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR). This child
murder analysis offers the richest level of legislative variation among the possible individual eligibility
factors and thus facilitates the estimation of a specification that may be well suited to address the
limitations of a difference-in-difference research design. In our preferred specification, we identify 16
states that amended their capital punishment eligibility statutes between 1985 and 2001 to include a
specific provision for child murders. While some amount of child murders would have been eligible for
capital punishment prior to these amendments under the remaining eligibility characteristics, most of
the relevant treatment states lacked alternative provisions flexible enough to cover the entirety of this
ground.
In each child murder specification, we include a general eligibility measure to control for the
scope of the remaining eligibility factors prevailing in the relevant state and year. This general measure
also facilitates a falsification exercise in which we explore the relationship between child murder rates
and the addition of eligibility factors that do not specifically target child homicides. To parameterize
these multifaceted eligibility expansions, we embrace the incident-level nature of the SHR data and
simulate the proportion of national homicides that would be eligible for the death penalty in each stateyear cell based on (a) the death penalty laws prevailing in the relevant state and year and (b) the
observed characteristics of the individual homicides. This simulation approach is inspired by studies in
public finance and labor economics that identify certain economic relationships using within-state
variations in delineated sets of eligibility criteria – for instance, variations in the eligibility criteria for
Medicaid coverage (Currie and Gruber, 1996).
Much of the existing death penalty literature has focused on estimating the deterrent effects
associated with the application of the death penalty – i.e., death sentences and executions. However,
the death penalty is so rarely employed in the United States and there is often such a large gap between
the time of sentencing and the time of execution, that any association between homicide rates and
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these application measures is likely to be small in magnitude (if it exists at all). An expansion of capital
punishment eligibility, such as that considered in this paper, may lead to enhanced deterrence under
two channels: (1) by leading to an increase in the number of capital sentences imposed and the number
of executions performed and (2) by providing the state with greater leverage to prosecute murderers
and thus to secure stronger punishments, even those non-capital in nature (Kuziemko, 2006). While the
first channel may be triggered in rare instances only, the effects arising from an enhanced prosecutorial
bargaining position should be felt with much greater frequency given the proportion of homicides that
meet the necessary eligibility requirements. Accordingly, it may be plausible to expect a stronger
deterrent response resulting from a strengthening of a prosecutorial bargaining position.
We find evidence of a negative association between child murder rates and the addition of child
murder provisions to capital eligibility statutes. Specifically, we estimate that the addition of a specific
eligibility factor for child murder is associated with an approximately 20% reduction in the homicide rate
of youth victims. The association between homicide rates and child murder expansions appear to be
isolated to the case of child homicides, as we find no evidence of a comparable relationship between
child murder provisions and adult homicide rates. We also find no relationship between child murder
rates and general eligibility expansions that are not specific to child murders. Moreover, these results
do not appear to be driven by state-specific trends that pre-date the adoption of child murder eligibility
laws.
We estimate results of similar magnitude when we turn to the estimation of a general eligibility
specification that explores the relationship between a more general homicide rate and a simulated
eligibility measure that draws on the full range of eligibility criteria (including child murders). However,
these results are relatively noisy and do not hold up well to the exclusion of the child murder factor from
the general simulation calculation.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review the existing literature and discuss the
nature of our contributions. In Section III, we discuss the nature of the expansions in capital punishment
eligibility criteria that have taken place over the last several decades. In Section IV, we discuss the data
and illustrate the two approaches that we take in the parameterization of capital eligibility laws. In
Sections V and VI, we present the empirical methodology and discuss the estimation results. Finally, in
Section VII, we conclude.
II.

Death Penalty and Deterrence

Theories on criminal behavior provide an ambiguous prediction regarding the impact of capital
punishment. On the one hand, the threat of the death penalty may operate to increase the expected
costs of murder and thus reduce incentives to engage in homicidal behavior. On the other hand,
executions may stimulate more homicides by validating the social acceptability of retributive actions
(Shepherd, 2005). Moreover, even ruling out the possibility of this latter “brutalization” effect, the
deterrent effect of capital punishment relies on the existence of certain preconditions. For instance,
criminals must understand and acknowledge death penalty probabilities and must find this form of
punishment sufficiently more severe than the alternatives.1 Given this underlying theoretical ambiguity,
further analysis becomes critical to understanding whether this principal justification for capital
punishment holds empirical merit. Accordingly, a long line of empirical studies has endeavored to
estimate the deterrent impact of the death penalty.
While earlier sociology studies did exist, the deterrence literature largely took off with Ehrlich’s
(1975) analyses of 1933-1969 national time series data. Ehrlich’s findings suggested that each execution
leads to 8 fewer homicides. Ehrlich’s analysis received significant attention by both policymakers and
academics alike and his findings inspired a slew of follow-up studies, many of which subjected these
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results to a range of specification checks.2 The results of these studies varied markedly, throwing
substantial uncertainty on the question of whether capital punishment deters criminal behavior.
The past decade has seen a resurgence of this literature, with a number of studies taking
advantage of jurisdiction-level panel data on homicide rates during the post-moratorium period. Many
of these recent studies present evidence of significant and far-reaching deterrence effects.3 Donohue
and Wolfers (2006) take an intensive look at this recent wave of papers and attempt to replicate many
of the key findings. Their analysis demonstrates the sensitivity of these recent findings to a host of
specification checks and other modifications, including: (a) the use of alternative sample periods, (b) the
addition of certain control groups, and (c) the treatment of within-group autocorrelation in estimating
standard errors. We defer to Donohue and Wolfers’ paper for a full discussion of the fragility of recent
deterrence studies; however, we identify a couple of their more general observations about the
limitations of the existing literature.
Donohue and Wolfers’ primary insight is to cast doubt on the ability to estimate an association
between homicide rates and measures of the intensity with which capital punishment is implemented.
Given that any such relationship may be limited in magnitude and given the rarity of death penalty
sentences and executions, it may simply be too difficult for the econometrician to separate the impact
of these rare occurrences from the effects of other factors driving the large fluctuations in homicide
rates.4 This difficulty may help to explain the substantial sensitivity of much of the results generated by
the literature to date.
In addition, Donohue and Wolfers identify a second major concern generally confronted by the
deterrence literature: omitted-variables bias. This concern is particularly pronounced in those studies
that identify deterrence using variations in the intensity with which capital punishment is applied.
2
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Prosecutors, after all, may be subject to political and other influences in deciding whether to pursue the
death penalty, where those influences may themselves be correlated in some fashion with observed
homicide rates (e.g., “get tough on crime” philosophies). Similar confounding factors may also shape
the decisions of the juries that ultimately impose the death penalty, along with the incentives of the
state to push for executions in the post-sentencing period.
In the empirical analysis below, we explore the deterrent effect of capital punishment with
these two empirical concerns in mind. Donohue and Wolfers' first concern regarding the rarity of the
application of the death penalty is largely statistical in nature; however, partially underlying this concern
is the idea that the true relationship between these application measures and homicide rates may itself
be small in magnitude. From a theoretical perspective, the limited scope of this relationship may also
follow from the infrequency of executions and from the large delays between sentences and executions
(Katz et al., 2003). In the present study, we avoid estimating a specification that considers only the
deterrent effects ensuing from those rare instances in which the death penalty is actually applied (i.e.,
sentences and executions). By exploiting variation in the existence or extent of capital punishment
legislation, we draw on an additional source of criminal deterrence that is less prone to this theoretical
concern: prosecutorial leverage. That is, regardless of how often capital punishment is actually
employed, as long as the threat of its use remains viable in the face of an alleged murderer, the
possibility of capital punishment may provide prosecutors with greater leverage to negotiate pleas with
alleged murderers. These heightened negotiations may lead to stronger overall punishments, which
may, in turn, deter further criminal behavior. Given the large proportion of murders that are at least
eligible for capital punishment, these prosecutorial forces may be expected to operate quite frequently,
providing an arguably more plausible basis for a sizeable deterrent effect. With the possibility of a
stronger deterrent channel, the resulting estimates may be robust even in the face of widely-varying
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homicide rates and may be less sensitive to specification error than those estimates based on an
evaluation of the intensity by which capital punishment is applied.
Kuziemko (2006) provides evidence in support of the contention that capital punishment
eligibility leads to greater bargaining power in the hands of prosecutors. Estimating differences-indifferences-in-differences models using the 1995 reinstatement of the death penalty in New York, in
connection with variations in the propensity of county prosecutors to pursue the death penalty,
Kuziemko estimates that the death penalty leads defendants to accept plea bargains with harsher terms,
while finding no impact on a defendant’s propensity to plead guilty itself. The harsher punishments
ensuing from capital punishment under this bargaining story may, in turn, lead to a general deterrent
effect on criminal behavior. Any such deterrent effect does not require that potential offenders be
aware of the actual extensions in the death penalty laws. Rather, potential offenders only need to
respond to an observation of harsher sentences being imposed on their criminal counterparts, where
those harsher sentences may follow from the prosecutorial forces associated with capital eligibility.
By drawing on a source of legislative variation that may lead to deterrence through both of the
channels identified above, our results should be interpreted appropriately. We are neither estimating
the separate relationship between homicide rates and the application of the death penalty (as
measured by execution and sentencing rates), nor the separate relationship between homicide rates
and some metric of prosecutorial leverage. Rather, the results generated from our specification can be
interpreted as the relationship between homicide rates and capital eligibility itself. That is, eligibility
takes on a distinctive presence in this analysis.
With respect to Donohue and Wolfers' second major concern, we address a potential omitted
variables problem by estimating difference-in-difference specifications that exploit within-state variation
in capital punishment eligibility statutes. Drawing on state-specific eligibility expansions allows us to
address unobserved factors by controlling for fixed differences across states, fixed differences across
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time periods, and state-specific linear time trends. The variation in statutory eligibility laws is arguably
less sensitive, though still not immune, to confounding influences.
Of course, other deterrence studies have explored “natural-experiment” methodologies based
on variations in state capital punishment laws. For instance, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006) use state
abolitions of the death penalty, along with their subsequent reinstatements, during the period
surrounding the 1970’s death penalty moratorium to estimate a fixed-effects deterrence specification.
While Donohue and Wolfers (2006) demonstrate the sensitivity of Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd’s (2006)
deterrence findings to certain specification checks (e.g., the inclusion of year fixed effects, as opposed to
decade fixed effects), the abolitions and reinstatements of the death penalty considered by Dezhbakhsh
and Shepherd nonetheless present an interesting set of variations by which to test the deterrent impact
of capital punishment. Moreover, on-off policy changes of this nature will also pick up general deterrent
effects arising from enhanced prosecutorial bargaining power.
However, while a large number of states experienced policy changes in the time period
surrounding the national death penalty moratorium of the 1970’s, most of this variation occurred at
identical moments of time over a large number of states. In modeling abolitions of death penalty
statutes, Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd consider 3 abolitions in the pre-1972 period (including New York in
1965), along with 34 abolitions in 1972, 32 of which occurred as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Furman v. Georgia. This variation can thus be seen as attributable to a relatively limited number of
actual policy changes. As such, with an arguably small number of effective treatment groups, the results
of this abolition model implicate concerns over the consistency of the estimated coefficients along with
the appropriateness of the standard methods of inference performed (Conley and Taber, 2005). Of
course, a difference-in-difference model exploiting the on-off variation associated with the 1970’s
national moratorium, as estimated by Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd, also draws on the subsequent
reinstatements of the death penalty statutes. The vast majority of these reinstatements effectively
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occurred in the 1-year period surrounding the 1976 Gregg decision by the Supreme Court. However,
seven states did reenact their death penalty statutes in subsequent years (between 1978 and 1995).
In the eligibility-expansion model that we estimate below, we draw on a far more staggered set
of policy changes than that possible by an exploration of early 1970’s abolitions. Moreover, while our
primary specifications focus solely on expansions of existing death penalty statutes, we also estimate
specifications that parameterize general eligibility laws in such a fashion that we necessarily draw on the
same set of post-Gregg statutory reinstatements considered by Dezhbakhsh and Shepherd (2006). In
light of the rich level of policy variation available from a model that embraces post-moratorium
eligibility expansions, our analysis may serve as a novel contribution to an empirical literature plagued
with limitations in the amount of information available to identify deterrent effects.
Moreover, in addition to drawing on an extensive set of eligibility expansions, by taking
advantage of incident-level homicide data made available in the post-moratorium period, we are able to
target the deterrence analysis on the set of homicides that are generally implicated by capital
punishment statutes – that is, those homicides that are potentially eligible for capital punishment. With
this approach, we may derive more precise deterrence estimates by removing any noise arising from
variations in the rates of non-capital-eligible homicides. This approach is in the spirit of Fagan et al.
(2006) who estimate the association between the application of capital punishment (e.g., capital
sentence and execution rates) and the rates of potentially-death-eligible homicides (and between the
general incidence of capital punishment statutes and potentially-death-eligible homicides). However,
we are aware of no study that has used variations in the underlying eligibility factors themselves as a
source of exogenous variation to identify the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
III.

Capital Punishment Eligibility

The Supreme Court effectively voided the capital punishment statutes of all death penalty states
with its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia (and companion cases), 408 U.S. 238 (1972), expressing

10

concern over the unbridled discretion granted to juries in imposing death sentences. This decision
suspended capital punishment in the United States until the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), in which the Court upheld newly-enacted death penalty statutes that
provided juries with guided discretion in capital cases. The Court in Gregg specifically upheld a Georgia
statute which bifurcated capital trials into guilt and sentencing stages, where juries in the latter stage
were required to determine the existence of certain aggravating circumstances and then weigh those
factors against other mitigating considerations. This process serves the function of both (a) providing
juries with clear and objective guidance and (b) narrowing the class of crimes eligible for capital
punishment (Kirchmeier, 2006).
In the aftermath of these decisions, new death penalty statutes set the scope of capital eligibility
either by restricting the definition of capital murder itself or by delineating a set of aggravating
circumstances for juries to consider during sentencing stages (Kirchmeier, 2006). Reviewing various
statutory materials, we track the evolution of each state’s list of eligibility factors / aggravating
circumstances from the mid 1970’s to the present.5 From the beginning of the post-moratorium period,
states did vary somewhat in the set of eligibility factors that they selected. Nonetheless, certain factors
appeared rather consistently across these initial statutes, including: (a) murders of police officers or
public officials, (b) murders committed by those with previous felony convictions (c) murders by those
who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a destructive device,
(d) felony murders (usually robberies, rapes, burglaries and arsons), (e) murders committed for
pecuniary gain, and (f) murders committed to avoid arrest. Various other factors were found across
some initial death penalty statutes, including murders committed while under incarceration, murders of

5

We codify those aggravating circumstances that can be identified by the SHR data. Table I indicates the year in
which specific child murder provisions became effective. The code used to assign capital eligibility status for each
homicide in the SHR sample based on the prevailing eligibility laws of each state-year cell can be obtained from the
authors upon request.
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witnesses in legal proceedings and murders involving especially heinous or atrocious behavior (e.g.,
torture).
Several states did expand their eligibility statutes to add some of the above factors (e.g., arsonrelated homicides) in the years following their initial reinstatements. However, the bulk of the postreinstatement expansions involved the following identifiable factors: child murder (16 states), multiplevictim murders (9 states), murders committed in connection with infractions of narcotics laws (9 states),
murders associated with gang-related activities (4 states), elderly murders (4 states), and murders
committed during carjackings (5 states).6 Moreover, in the case of many of these eligibility factors, the
statutory expansions occurred in a relatively staggered manner over the sample period. For instance, as
illustrated in Table I, five of the child murder policy changes occurred during the 1980’s, five during the
early 1990’s, five during the late 1990’s and 1 during the 2000’s. Additions of narcotics-related
homicides, on the other hand, largely occurred over a very narrow time period (1989-1990).
We ultimately attempt to combine all of this variation in some rational fashion into a single
specification and evaluate whether eligibility extensions are generally associated with an average
reduction in homicide rates. To facilitate this exercise in the face of vastly different eligibility categories
and in the face of multiple expansions within the same state over time, we turn to a parameterization
methodology that effectively simulates a state's propensity to extend capital eligibility to a given
homicide. As discussed further below, however, this general eligibility investigation may be limited by
measurement error involved in the simulation process and by other concerns stemming from the
necessary use of a broadly-defined and widely-varying homicide rate. For these reasons, we focus the
analysis on the estimation of a difference-in-difference specification that uses a more limited homicide
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rate and that draws on expansions of eligibility laws covering a single homicide type: the murder of
youth victims.
With 16 statutory amendments (as many as 20 in some specifications), child murder eligibility
expansions represent the most common of the relevant policy changes over the sample period.
Eligibility categories for multiple-victim homicides and narcotics-related homicides were also added by
9 states over the same period; accordingly, we do present difference-in-difference results for these
additional expansions in Section VI.D below. The multiple-victim homicide specification generates
results of a similar nature and magnitude to those generated by the child murder specification. The
narcotics-related adoptions, however, largely occurred together in the 1989-1990 period, leaving few
effective treatment groups. Similarly, each of the additional eligibility categories (e.g., homicides of
elderly victims) only vary over only a small number of states throughout the sample period. With few
effective treatment groups, estimating separate difference-in-difference specifications for each of these
eligibility types would raise concerns regarding the consistency of the estimated eligibility coefficients
and of the resulting standard errors (Conley and Taber, 2005).7 The child murder specification is
perhaps best suited to address the limitations of a difference-in-difference approach. In any event,
considering the possibility of estimating eligibility specifications of a similar nature for the remaining
eligibility types, we do address inference on the child murder results with a consideration of possible
family-wise error.
Moreover, adoptions of child murder factors represent a considerable expansion in death
penalty eligibility considering that roughly 5% of the homicides in our sample were committed against
victims under the age of 15 and that the average state in our sample only extends capital eligibility to
16% of total homicides (based on the observed characteristics of the homicides in our sample). Of
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course, some child murders would have been eligible for capital punishment prior to these statutory
amendments based on certain of the remaining eligibility factors, in which case these figures may
overstate the extent of the expansion. For instance, certain states would have captured some range of
child murders under the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” (HAC) aggravating factor. While all
murders arguably meet the definitions of these words, courts are not meant to use this factor as a
catch-all category and are generally required to restrict its application to extraordinary situations
involving, for instance, wanton and depraved infliction of serious physical pain (e.g., torture).8 However,
many courts have nonetheless taken a flexible approach with this aggravating factor and some have
allowed consideration of the helplessness of the victim in determining whether this condition has been
met.9
In any case, it is reasonable to expect that the addition of a specific eligibility factor for child
murder will indeed lead to the extension of capital eligibility to a large number of child murders. First of
all, out of the 16 treatment states that adopted child murder eligibility provisions over the sample
period, only 4 provide for an alternative eligibility factor concerning murders of an HAC-like nature.10
The remaining treatment states either include no such factor (e.g., Ohio ) or avoid the use of this vague
terminology and specifically limit capital eligibility to instances of torture (e.g., Pennsylvania).11 Out of
those control states that did not amend their eligibility statutes over the sample period to add child
murder provisions, a larger proportion of them provide for an HAC-like alternative factor. Thus, it is
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possible that the treatment states, in enacting specific child murder provisions, were responding to the
perceived inability of the remaining factors to extend capital eligibility to child homicides.
Second, when applicable, the helplessness of the victim is but one factor to consider in
determining whether murders are of an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel nature. Even when courts
consider the helplessness of the victims in an HAC-like analysis, they nonetheless continue to stress
other circumstances of the homicides, including the seriousness of the pain inflicted or the depraved
state of mind of the offender.12 Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that such states would extend
capital eligibility to all instances of child homicide under an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel”
factor. Moreover, given the ill-defined and controversial nature of this eligibility factor (Rosen, 1986), it
is quite reasonable to believe that the separate delineation of a child murder aggravating factor will
strengthen the state’s case for capital punishment and provide for an additional, clearly-defined
aggravating factor that may be used in outweighing any determined mitigating circumstances.13
IV.

Data and Parameterizations of Eligibility Laws

Homicide data from 1977 to 2004 comes from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR). The SHR is an incident-level data base containing information
on various individual characteristics of reported homicides, including (i) the time and location of the
offense, (ii) certain victim characteristics (e.g., age, race, etc.), (iv) certain offender characteristics, (v)
the weapon used, and (vi) the circumstances of the homicide (e.g., during robbery). This information is
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environment following the moratorium on executions announced by Governor Ryan.
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provided each month to the FBI by local law enforcement agencies participating in the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reporting Program. While not completely inclusive, the SHR sample contains information on just
over 90% of the homicides that occurred over the sample period. The SHR provides individual weights
to allow state-year SHR homicide counts to match the more complete state-year homicide rates
reported under the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. We use un-weighted observations for the primary
analysis below. However, as indicated in Section VI, we estimate nearly identical results when we
incorporate the provided weights.
To form the dependent variables used in the specifications estimated below, we aggregate the
SHR homicide records into state-year cells and calculate various state-year homicide rates.14 We use
different homicide rates for the different regression specifications estimated below – e.g., murder rates
of youth victims for the child murder eligibility models. Thus, while the specifications are of an
aggregate nature, we draw on the provided individual homicide characteristics to tailor the state-year
cells to particular classes of homicides. We discuss these calculations in further detail in Section V
below. Table II provides descriptive statistics for the homicide rates and relevant eligibility law
variables. We match data on certain covariates to each of these state-year cells. We control for the
following state-year measures: unemployment rate, incarceration rate, police employment rate, police
expenditure rate, judicial/prosecutorial expenditure rate, percentage 15-19 years old, percentage 20-24
years old, percentage black, percentage living in urban areas, and median household income.15
To each state-year cell containing homicide and covariate information, we also merge measures
indicating the status of death penalty eligibility laws in effect in the relevant state and year. We
14
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15
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operations and on judicial and prosecutorial operations is from the Criminal Justice Expenditure and Employment
(CJEE) Extracts (1982-2004) and the CJEE Surveys (1977-1981).
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parameterize eligibility laws in two basic manners. First, we consider the amendment of capital
punishment statutes to extend eligibility to certain specific types of homicides, primarily child murder.
That is, we match to each state-year cell a binary indicator variable that equals 0 during those years in
which a state does not specifically include child murder as an eligibility factor / aggravating circumstance
and 1 during those years in which it does provide for this factor. In the specifications estimated below,
we drop the state-year cell corresponding to the year of the law change itself in order to avoid any
difficulty in assigning indicator variables to mid-year adoptions. 16
Second, instead of confining the analysis to the effect of specific eligibility expansions (i.e., child
murder), we attempt to draw on the full range of eligibility expansions that occur over the sample
period. Rather than including a set of individual indicator variables for each such factor, we
parameterize eligibility statutes along these more general lines using a single measure of the propensity
of a given state to provide capital eligibility for a given murder. Having documented the evolution of
each state’s eligibility statutes over time, we apply the operable statutes of each state-year cell to a
sample of individual homicides in order to simulate the likelihood that a given homicide will be subject
to capital eligibility. More specifically, we do the following calculation for each state-year cell: (1)
determine whether each individual homicide from a national sample of homicides (for the relevant year)
is eligible for capital punishment based on the laws of the state-year cell under investigation and the
reported characteristics of the individual homicide17 and (2) calculate the proportion of the national
annual sample of homicides that is eligible for capital punishment based on the individual simulations
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The estimation results presented below are nearly identical when we instead set the child murder indicator
equal to 1 in the year of adoption if the effective date of the law change occurs in the first half of the year and
equal to 1 in the following year if the effective date falls in the latter half of the adoption year.
17
The national sample of homicides used to simulate an eligibility percentage for a given state excludes the
homicides associated with that state. We take separate national samples for each year to form the simulated
measure for each state in that year. However, we generate nearly identical results (not shown) when we take the
full national sample over all years (or from just one given year – e.g., 1996) and apply that fixed national sample to
the laws of each state and year.
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from step (1).18 Repeating this procedure for each state-year cell gives a full set of simulated eligibility
percentages. In forming these simulated measures, we confine the underlying national sample of
homicides to the universe of “potentially-death-eligible” homicides – that is, the set of homicides with
characteristics that would trigger capital eligibility in at least 1 state.19
The resulting variable can be thought of as a measure of the extent to which any given state
draws from the universal list of eligibility characteristics. Additions of eligibility factors in a state
translate into higher simulated percentages. The addition of a specific factor will contribute to this
simulated percentage according to the joint likelihood of observing that specific factor, together with
accompanying factors, in a given homicide.
We apply this simulation approach in two ways in the death penalty analysis presented below.
First, in the primary child murder specification, we include a general simulation measure in order to
control for the extent of the remaining eligibility provisions in effect for the relevant state and year. In
calculating this general covariate measure, we exclude the child murder eligibility factor from the
simulation exercise. This control is important in light of the reasonable likelihood that child murder
eligibility provisions are correlated with the presence of additional eligibility factors. As discussed
further in Section VI below, this general covariate measure also facilitates a falsification exercise in
which we estimate the effect of general (i.e., non-child-murder) eligibility provisions on child murder
rates. Second, we apply this simulation methodology in alternative specifications that explore a more
general relationship between eligibility and homicide rates. In such specifications, we calculate a
general simulation measure based on all eligibility factors, including child murder.
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We form eligibility percentages based on the SHR victim file, which provides one record for each homicide
victim. The SHR data also includes an alternative organization of homicide records that provides one record for
each offender. We estimate nearly identical results when we use the SHR offender file to generate the simulated
eligibility measures.
19
As discussed further in Section V below, in calculating these measures, we also exclude from the underlying
national sample all homicides committed by offenders under the age of 16.
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By using a national sample of homicides to simulate the above eligibility percentages, rather
than a state-specific sample, we abstract from state-specific factors (other than eligibility laws) that may
confound the empirical analysis below by contributing both to state-specific homicide rates and to
observed measures of a state’s likelihood of extending capital eligibility to given homicides. That is, this
simulated eligibility measure is designed to capture variations in eligibility laws themselves and not
variations in the state-specific applications of these laws. This simulation methodology is motivated by a
number of studies in public finance and labor economics. Representing one of the pioneering
applications of this approach, Currie and Gruber (1996) draw on within-state changes in Medicaid
eligibility rules over time to estimate the effect of Medicaid eligibility on healthcare utilization and
outcomes. To abstract from individual- and state-specific factors that may be correlated with both
utilization and eligibility propensities, they instrument individual eligibility with simulated measures of
the percentage of children in randomly-drawn national samples (within age groups) that are eligible for
Medicaid based on the prevailing eligibility rules for the relevant state-year-age group.
On average, there are roughly 6200 “potentially-death-eligible” homicides in the annual national
samples from which these simulated eligibility percentages are derived. The SHR does not contain
enough information to allow for a perfect eligibility calculation. For instance, it would not be possible to
determine whether the homicide was committed against a potential witness to a crime or whether the
murder involved torture. Nonetheless, the SHR does provide numerous homicide characteristics that
implicate eligibility provisions, including the ages of the victims and offenders, the weapon used (e.g.,
explosives), and the following circumstances of the homicide: (1) robbery, (2) rape, (3) burglary, (4)
arson, (5) certain other felonies (e.g., auto theft), (6) institution killing (e.g., prison homicide), (7)
narcotics-related, and (8) gang-related. Moreover, the SHR files also allow for identification of those
instances in which more than one victim were killed during this incident, another common eligibility
factor. While incomplete, the information provided by the SHR data allows for the identification of a
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substantial majority of death-eligible homicides. Fagan et al. (2006) use the first 100 executions that
occurred following March 1, 2006 as a benchmark to test the accuracy of a capital-eligibility assignment
process based on SHR data. Using court records, they identify the aggravating circumstances
established during the course of the proceedings of those benchmark cases. Based on the
characteristics of the homicides associated with these executions, they then found that the categories
available in the SHR files would have identified capital eligibility in all but 5 of these 100 cases.20
V.

Methodology

We draw on within-state variations in the scope of capital punishment laws to identify the
deterrent effect associated with capital eligibility, as distinct from the more specific deterrent effect
associated with the application of capital punishment – i.e., executions and death penalty sentences.
Specifically, we estimate the following specification:
ܪ௦,௧ = ߙ + ߛ௦ + ߣ௧ + ߮௦,௧ + ߚଵ ܺ௦,௧ + ߚଶ ܩܫܮܧ௦,௧ + ߝ௦,௧

(1)

where s indexes state and t indexes year and Xs,t represents various state-year covariates (e.g.,
unemployment rate). State fixed effects, γs, and year fixed effects, λt, control for fixed differences across
states and across years, respectively. We include a set of state-specific linear time trends, φs,t, to control
for slowly-moving correlations between state homicide rates and expansions of capital punishment
eligibility criteria.
The relevant eligibility variables are included in ELIGs,t. The construction of these variables is
discussed in greater detail in Section IV above. We estimate two essential types of specifications. In our
primary specifications, we focus on the factor that contributes most to the within-state variation in
20

The proceedings in 2 of those 5 unidentified cases, for instance, based the death sentence on the heinousness or
atrociousness of the killing, without also basing it on another factor that would have been identified by the SHR
data. Of course, Fagan et al.’s (2006) accuracy analysis assumes that a given jurisdiction’s eligibility laws include all
of those factors available in the SHR files. Thus, if one attempts to parameterize the expansion of eligibility factors,
Fagan et al.’s reported analysis does not identify the accuracy of this parameterization. For instance, in the case of
the addition of a child-murder factor, we do not know how many child homicides would have been deemed
eligible for capital punishment prior to the addition of this new factor based on the alternative heinous, atrocious
or cruel factor (if applicable).
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eligibility laws over time: child murder. In such specifications, ELIG includes an indicator variable for the
presence of a law making the murder of a youth victim specifically eligible for capital punishment. In
each child murder specification, we also control for the scope of the remaining eligibility provisions by
including a single variable that simulates the percentage of “potentially-death-eligible” homicides that is
eligible for capital punishment based on the eligibility provisions in place for the relevant state-year cell,
excluding child murder eligibility as a factor in this simulation exercise. In an alternative set of
specifications, we investigate the relationship between capital eligibility and more general homicide
rates (as opposed to child murder rates). In such specifications, we parameterize eligibility expansions
using an even more general simulation approach that considers all possible eligibility factors, including
child murder.
The coefficient of interest in the above specification is represented by β2, which captures the
association between homicide rates and capital punishment eligibility. Negative values of β2 are
consistent with a deterrent response. Generally, reductions in rates of criminal behavior arising from
stronger forms of punishment may be attributable to either a deterrent effect or an incapacitation
effect (i.e., putting criminals in a position where they can commit no further crimes). In the present
study, we examine the impact of enhancing the strongest form of punishment for murder. The
alternatives to capital punishment, however, are already expected to result in significant prison time.
Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the marginal impact of capital eligibility as arising from deterrence of
criminal behavior and not from the incapacitation of convicted murderers (Abrams, 2007). Of course, if
capital eligibility does provide prosecutors with greater success at reaching plea agreements in the first
place, as distinct from reaching stronger pleas, then the results may be picking up some level of
incapacitation.
We tailor the dependent variable, H, to the particular specification. The primary specification
focuses on the effect of child murder eligibility expansions. In these binary child murder models, we
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specify the dependent variable as the log of the child murder rate, where this rate equals the number of
murders of youth victims divided by the youth population. Thus, we do not attempt to explain
variations in those homicides that are not directly implicated by a child-murder eligibility provision. In
the general percentage-eligibility models, we specify the dependent variable using a broader range of
homicides and using total state-year populations as the denominator. However, as we do in the case of
the child-murder models, we avoid any noise arising from variations in homicides that are not directly
deterrable by capital punishment by focusing the homicide rate calculation on the set of “potentiallydeath-eligible” homicides. That is, we compile a list of all of the aggravating circumstances that exist
across the various death penalty statutes (and that can be identified in the SHR data) and then calculate
state-year homicide rates out of the universe of homicides that contain at least 1 such characteristic
(regardless of the eligibility provisions of the given state).21
A small number of state-year cells have no child homicides. Before log-transforming the
dependent variable, we set the homicide rates for these zero-valued cells at 0.1 (Malani, 2002). The
pattern and magnitude of results presented below remain virtually identical when we estimate
alternative specifications that log-transform unadjusted homicide rates (and thereby drop zero-valued
cells) and when we specify the dependent variable as actual homicide rates (i.e., non-log-transformed).
Over most of the sample period (from 1988-2004), states were subject to Supreme Court
doctrine specifically prohibiting them from imposing capital punishment on offenders under the age of
16.22 Prior to 1988, as discussed in the Supreme Court’s 1989 Stanford decision, the majority of death
penalty states also declined to impose the death penalty on offenders under the age of 16 (15 states) or
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In other words, we calculate general homicide rates excluding those homicides that would fail to trigger capital
eligibility under the death penalty laws of every state. For instance, homicides committed by means of an
explosive device trigger capital eligibility in certain states. Thus, to form the relevant dependent variable, we
include all explosive-related homicides in the homicide-rate calculation for each state, even for those states that
do not provide for capital eligibility in these instances.
22
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Supreme Court
later raised this minimum age to 18 in 2005. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551.
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17 (12 states). While we do not parameterize any slight variations in eligibility percentages that may
exist due to variation in offender age limits, we nonetheless attempt to focus the empirical analysis on
the set of homicides that are generally implicated by capital punishment laws. Accordingly, in
calculating both the state-year homicide rates and the simulated eligibility measures, we exclude form
the underlying sample all homicides committed by offenders under the age of 16.23
Finally, we restrict the regression sample to those states that effectively narrow the scope of
capital eligibility using only one set of eligibility restrictions. Most death penalty states meet this
condition either by limiting the definition of capital murder or by requiring the finding of delineated
aggravating circumstances during capital sentencing stages. A small number of states, however, apply a
two-tiered narrowing process that effectively imposes different (i.e., non-overlapping) eligibility
restrictions in both the capital murder definition and the sentencing proceedings.24 We drop these
states in order to avoid concerns over the unknown nature of the interaction between these two tiers
(e.g., where states may place different emphasis on one set of restrictions over another). Alabama, for
instance, added child murder as an eligibility factor in its capital homicide definition in 1992 but excludes
a specific child murder provision from the list of aggravating circumstances to be determined during
sentencing. In this instance, it is possible that child murders will still meet one of the aggravating
circumstances required at sentencing (e.g., Alabama’s “heinous, atrocious or cruel” circumstance), even
if we cannot identify that circumstance using SHR records. However, the reach of these alternative
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We do not draw on any variations in this offender-age margin as we did not research and compile the full history
of relevant laws.
24
These states include Connecticut, Alabama, Mississippi, New Hampshire and Kansas. Certain other states
technically contain a death penalty evaluation process at both the capital-definition stage and the sentencing
stage, but effectively impose delineated eligibility limitations at only one stage. In the other stage, such states
often require juries to make more subjective determinations. For instance, at the sentencing stage in Texas, juries
are asked to determine “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071. For the purposes of this
empirical analysis, we focus solely on those stages that impose delineated eligibility criteria. We also include
states with two-stage eligibility processes in which the capital-definition stage and the sentencing stage effectively
impose parallel criteria that vary together over time (at least with respect to the factors identifiable in the SHR
records) -- e.g., Louisiana.
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factors/circumstances is unknown, confounding our ability to properly specify both the binary child
murder model and the general simulated eligibility model. Nonetheless, we explore alternative
specifications below that relax these sample restrictions and include capital eligibility provisions from
the relevant two-tiered states.
Unobservable state-year factors are represented by the random error term, εs,t. The estimated
coefficient of the eligibility variable, ELIG, is identified under an assumption of conditional mean
independence (E [ ε|ELIG, X, γ, λ, φ ] = E [ ε|X, γ, λ, φ ]) – that is, an assumption that the eligibility
variable is uncorrelated with unobservable state-year shocks, taking as given the state effects, year
effects, state-specific linear trends and observable covariates. This condition may not hold if states
expand capital eligibility statutes to include child homicides contemporaneously with other policy
changes that may impact child homicide rates. We partially address this concern below by testing for
evidence indicative of contemporaneous policy changes targeting homicide rates more broadly. More
generally, the identification condition may fail to hold if states adopt child murder expansions in
response to unobservable factors that contribute to a differential trend in homicide rates between
treatment and control states. We partially explore these concerns by modifying the primary
specification to include leads of the child murder eligibility provision. The coefficients of the lead
indicators allow us to test for differential child homicide trends during the period leading up to eligibility
expansions. The presence of any such lead effects may implicate the confounding influence of
unobservable factors. The estimated lead coefficients also allow us to evaluate whether the primary
difference-in-difference result is, in part, a reflection of a spike in child homicide rates in the period
surrounding the relevant reforms, where this spike may have contributed to the expansion decision
itself.25

25

Of course, even if states do enact reforms in response to recent state-specific events, spikes of this nature may
not occur if states act in response to a small number of high-profile incidents (or a single incident). Legislative
endogeneity may also contribute to a biased estimate if states add child murder eligibility provisions in anticipation
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VI.

Results

A. Child Murders
We begin by presenting difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of child murder
eligibility expansions on child murder rates. Each observation in the specifications estimated
throughout Section VI is weighted by the state-year population count used to form the denominator in
the relevant dependent variable (e.g., the number of children under the age of 15 for those models
using a dependent variable based on the under-15 homicide rate). Moreover, in the models estimated
throughout this section, all standard errors are clustered at the state level to allow for arbitrary withinstate correlations of the error structure.
In our primary child murder specification, we specify the dependent variable as the log of the
rate of homicides of victims under the age of 15. We present results from these primary specifications
in Table III. As presented in Column 1, we estimate a statistically-significant coefficient of -0.20 for the
child-murder eligibility indicator, representing an approximately 20% decrease in the under-15 homicide
rate following the adoption of a capital punishment law that establishes a specific eligibility category /
aggravating circumstance for child murder. With an average annual homicide rate of 1.6 per 100,000
children under the age of 15 (weighted by the under-15 population) and an average under-15 state
population of 1.2 million (for the estimated sample), this estimate corresponds to an annual per-state
reduction of roughly 4 child homicides.
In Column 2 of Table III, we modify the primary difference-in-difference specification to include
a 2-year lead indicator variable, which switches from 0 to 1 two years prior to the adoption of the
relevant child murder provision. We specify the 2-year lead indicator based on whether the initial
adoption occurred during the first or second half of the calendar year (e.g., the 2-year lead switches
of an uptrend in child homicide rates. This could lead to the estimation of a positive relationship between child
murder adoptions and child murder rates when no such causal relationship exists. However, in the face of this
conceivable positive bias, we nonetheless estimate a negative relationship consistent with a deterrent effect of
capital eligibility.
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from 0 to 1 in 1988 for an amendment that occurs in December, 1989). However, we continue to drop
the state-year cells representing the actual year of adoption from the specification to address mid-year
adoption concerns regarding the primary coefficients (as such, we begin with a 2-year lead indicator, as
opposed to a 1-year lead indicator, to ensure that we do not drop any cells that would otherwise
identify the separate lead coefficient).26 We now estimate a statistically-significant coefficient of -0.21
for the contemporaneous child murder indicator and a smaller, statistically-insignificant coefficient of
0.02 for the lead indicator variable. Accordingly, we find no evidence of differential trends between
treatment and control states in child murder rates that pre-date the adoption of child murder eligibility
laws. This finding provides greater confidence that the estimated contemporaneous results are
reflective of a policy response to the amendment of capital punishment statutes, as opposed to other
factors that may contribute to differential trends. These findings also suggest that child murder
expansions were not adopted in the aftermath of large spikes in child murder rates, which would
otherwise confound the primary difference-in-difference analysis.
We expand on this pre-adoption analysis in Column 3 of Table III by including an even greater
number of lead indicator variables (from 2 to 6 years prior to adoption). This specification allows for a
richer view of any differential pre-adoption trends between treatment and control states. We estimate
statistically-insignificant coefficients for each of the lead indicator variables. The 2-, 3- and 4-year lead
coefficients are positive in sign and small in magnitude (relative to the contemporaneous effects), again
suggesting little difference between treatment and control states in the period leading up to child
murder eligibility adoptions. We estimate a larger negative differential in the period between 4 and 5
years prior to adoption, though this estimate is still smaller in magnitude than the contemporaneous
effects. Finally, the estimated coefficient of the 6-year lead is nearly 0 in magnitude. The dynamic
26

However, we estimate a nearly identical result using an alternative approach that also drops the actual year of
law change but that includes a lead indicator variable that switches from 0 to 1 in the period represented by the
calendar year prior to the year of adoption (e.g., a 1-year lead period represented by the entirety of 1995 for a law
change that occurs in November, 1996).
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results presented in Column 3 emphasize the extent of the drop in child murder rates that occur upon
the enactment of a child murder eligibility provision and provide even greater confidence in an
interpretation of the primary deterrence estimates as not simply reflecting trends that began in the preadoption period.
It may take time for deterrent responses to materialize following the expansion of capital
punishment statutes. Any increase in capital sentences or executions that arises from an expansion in
the number of capital-eligible crimes may be slow to emerge considering the long delays that exist in the
adjudication of capital cases and in the carrying out of capital sentences. On the other hand, increases
in non-capital sentence lengths arising from death penalty eligibility may emerge with less of a delay
depending on how quickly prosecutors begin to take advantage of their enhanced bargaining positions.
In Column 3 of Table III, we also test for delayed effects of child murder eligibility adoptions by including
a 2-year lag indicator variable that switches from 0 to 1 two years following the adoption of the relevant
eligibility provision. While we estimate an approximately 24% reduction in the under-15 homicide rate
in the 2-year period following a child murder adoption, we estimate a small, statistically-insignificant
positive differential between this immediate period and the subsequent years, suggesting both a
persistence in the estimated relationship and a relatively immediate impact. The immediacy of this
relationship suggests that it is more likely to occur through a prosecutorial-leverage channel than a
subsequent-death-sentence/execution channel.
Column 4 of Table III estimates the same dynamic specification of Column 3, but no longer
includes the set of state-specific linear time trends. Column 5 subsequently drops the additional stateyear covariates (e.g., unemployment rate). We estimate a nearly identical pattern of results in each
case, suggesting that the estimated coefficients presented in Column 1 – 3 are robust to any assumption
regarding the linearity of omitted state-year factors and are otherwise not the spurious result of large
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changes in observed factors that happen to coincide with the adoption of child murder provisions
(Gruber and Hungerman, 2008).
States vary in the age cut-offs that they use in their child murder eligibility statutes, as
presented in Table I. While most statutes set cut-offs ranging from 12 to 16 years old, the state with the
lowest limit, Texas, provides capital eligibility for murders of victims below the age of 6. We estimate
nearly identical results when we specify the dependent variable as the log of the rate of homicides of
victims under the age of 5 and thus confine the analysis to a set of homicides that falls entirely with the
scope of each of the child murder eligibility laws (Column 6 of Table III).27 All of the treatment states
other than Texas have a cut-off that is above 10 years old. Thus, in the same spirit, we also estimate a
specification that excludes Texas and that bases the dependent variable on an under-10 homicide rate.
As presented in Column 7 of Table III, we continue to estimate substantially similar results.
In Table IV, we consider an alternative parameterization of the child murder eligibility variable
that accounts for the variations across states in the operable victim age cut-offs. In this approach, we
take a national sample of all homicides of children under the age of 17 and simulate, for each state, the
percentage of those child homicides that would be eligible for capital punishment under the relevant
state’s child murder eligibility provisions. Wyoming, for instance, amended its statute in 1989 to provide
capital eligibility for murders of victims under the age of 17 (the highest age cut-off among the states)
and thus generates a simulated eligibility value of 1 in the post-1989 period. As presented in Column 1
of Table IV, we estimate that as a state makes 100% of homicides of children under the age of 17 eligible
for capital punishment, the child homicide rate falls by approximately 31% (significant at the 1% level).
Moreover, as suggested by Column 2, this negative effect does not appear to be reflective of a trend
that began in the pre-adoption period.
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We use an under-5 homicide rate, as opposed to an under-6 homicide rate, given that our data on population
estimates by age (which form the relevant homicide-rate denominators) are collected only in 5-year age
increments.
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If potential offenders do respond to perceived changes in the punishment of child murderers
(whether by observing plea bargains reached or sentences imposed at trial), it may be too demanding to
assume that they could make such observations with an awareness of any differential treatment in the
ages of the relevant victims (and thus deem it less risky to harm a child that is, e.g., 15 years old instead
of 14 years old). Thus, it is arguably valid to estimate specifications that include a general, uniform child
homicide rate as the dependent variable (such as those using under-15 homicide rates in Tables III and
IV), even in the face of eligibility laws that vary across age groups.28 While potential offenders may not
acknowledge the existence of differential punishments across specific age groups, they may be
responsive to the overall level of punishment observed against youth offenders. Moreover, the
operable age cut-offs may indeed place bounds on prosecutorial behavior and may nonetheless have a
real effect on such overall punishment levels. Thus, it may nonetheless be informative to estimate, as
we do in Table IV, the relationship between child homicide rates and a propensity measure that proxies
for a state's general aggressiveness (at least on a statutory basis) in prosecuting child homicides.
The final row in Table IV presents estimated coefficients for the covariate measure represented
by the simulated percentage of “potentially-death-eligible” homicides that are eligible for capital
punishment based on the relevant state-year eligibility rules for all remaining eligibility factors
(excluding the child murder factor from the calculation). This variable both controls for the scope of the
remaining eligibility provisions prevailing in the relevant state and year, while at the same time allows
for a falsification test in which we estimate the effect of expansions in other eligibility factors (e.g.,
narcotics-related) on the rate of child homicides. There may of course be some relationship between
such expansions and child murder given that youths are the victims of homicides that may attain capital
eligibility under some other factor. However, it is reasonable to expect that any such relationship is
28

For this reason, plausibility concerns may be too severe with an alternative approach that estimates a tripledifferences specification that draws on differential age cut-offs and variations in the homicide responses among
different childhood age groups. Also confounding any such approach is the fact that the age cut-offs are all
predominantly clustered above 12 years old, with only 1 state having a below-10 cut-off (Texas).
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weaker than that resulting from an expansion of eligibility statutes that specifically reaches all child
homicides. Consistent with these expectations, we find no statistically-significant relationship between
child murders and general eligibility expansions. While the estimated coefficients are negative, they are
significantly smaller in magnitude than the primary child murder eligibility coefficients.
In the above specifications, we focus solely on eligibility expansions, as distinct from initial
adoptions of capital punishment statutes. Accordingly, for those several states that enact general
statutes over the sample period (e.g., New York), we exclude those years in which no death penalty
statute was in effect.29 In Table V, we present results from alternative specifications that include all
sample years, along with an indicator variable for the presence of a general death penalty statute.30 We
estimate nearly identical coefficients for the relevant child murder eligibility dummies and continue to
estimate a small, statistically-insignificant coefficient for the general simulated eligibility percentage (for
the non-child-murder factors). Furthermore, we estimate a coefficient of -0.33 (p-value of 0.06) for the
general death penalty indicator, suggesting that the general presence of a death penalty statute, aside
from the scope of its eligibility, may be associated with a reduction in child homicide rates. In Column 2,
we include 2-year lead indicators for both the child murder provision and the general death penalty
statute. We estimate a spike in child homicide rates in the 2-year period prior to initial statutory
enactments (implicating possible legislative endogeneity concerns), followed by an even larger decline in
the period thereafter.
Table VI presents the results from a falsification test in which we estimate the association
between the adoption of child murder eligibility laws and the rate of homicides of victims over 20 years
old. Given that these particular expansions are expected to result in enhanced punishments of child
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In each specification, however, we do include as controls those states that never reinstated the death penalty
following the national moratorium.
30
In no instance does the date of an initial statutory enactment coincide with the date of a child murder eligibility
adoption. That is, for those states that adopt general statutes over the sample period, child murder eligibility
factors were not included among the relevant initial statutes.
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murderers only, one may not expect to observe a reduction in homicide rates of older victims.
Consistent with these expectations, we estimate a smaller, statistically-insignificant relationship
between child murder eligibility adoptions and adult homicide rates. While the estimated coefficient of
the child murder dummy, -0.04, is still negative in sign, it is considerably smaller in magnitude relative to
the estimated coefficient from the primary child murder specification. As presented in Table VI, we can
reject at 1% confidence the hypothesis that the child murder coefficients from the respective under-15
and over-20 specifications are equal. Moreover, the results from Column 2 suggest that any negative
differential in adult homicide rates between treatment and control states may have begun in the period
prior to the relevant eligibility amendment. Thus, unlike the primary specifications estimated above, it
does not appear that the adoption of a child murder eligibility law is associated with a corresponding
reduction in adult homicide rates. While it is possible that potential murderers may be deterred by
stronger punishments of homicides generally (e.g., they may learn of the imposition of stronger
punishments for murders but be unaware of the particulars of the crimes), we find that the response of
child murder eligibility laws is targeted at child murder rates.31
To the extent that child murder eligibility adoptions may be correlated with a general “gettough-on-crime” movement within a state, the estimated reduction in child homicide rates may be due
to these latter unobserved efforts and not due to the eligibility expansions themselves. However, if such
a correlation were to exist, one might expect to observe a relationship between child murder eligibility
adoptions and rates of other types of homicides. Moreover, if eligibility expansions in general move
contemporaneously with other crime-fighting developments, one might also expect to find a
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In a similar analysis (not shown), we add the general death penalty enactment variable to this falsification
exercise. While the child murder eligibility provision may be expected to have a different relationship with under15 homicides and over-20 homicide rates, the general enactment variable may be expected to have similar
relationships with each such homicide rate. Consistent with these expectations and similar to the findings of the
child-murder specifications estimated in Table V, we estimate a large negative relationship (with a statisticallysignificant coefficient of -0.50) between the general enactment variable and the homicide rate of victims older
than 20 years old.
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relationship between child murder rates and the adoption of other (non-child-murder) eligibility
expansions. Thus, the falsification exercises considered above, which find no evidence to support any of
these additional relationships, may appease concerns of this nature. Of course, they do not eliminate
such concerns and one should still be cautious in attributing causation to these estimates. The child
murder findings, after all, may still be reflective of contemporaneous movements within states
attributable of a more specific “get-tough-on-youth-crime” nature.
B. Additional Child Murder Specification Checks
The child murder results presented above are robust to a number of additional sensitivity tests.
For instance, we find that the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of
the child murder indicator presented in Column 1 of Table III are robust to the systematic, one-by-one
exclusion of each treatment state, including Texas, from the estimation model (not shown). Each
separate panel in Table VII further subjects the primary specification estimated in Column 1 of Table III
to certain modifications. First, we estimate a substantially similar coefficient when dropping the statespecific linear time trends from the primary specification (Panel A)32 and when estimating a specification
that includes both linear and quadratic state-specific trends (Panel B). Likewise, we estimate a nearly
identical coefficient when excluding the control variable meant to capture the scope of the remaining
eligibility provisions (Panel C). Considering that some child murders may attain capital eligibility under
an aggravating factor that targets homicides of an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” nature, we
also estimate a specification that excludes those four treatment states that provide for these alternative
eligibility provisions (or similarly-worded provisions).33 As presented in Panel D, we find that the
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The dynamic specifications estimated in Columns 4 and 5 of Table III also drop the state-specific linear trends.
As discussed in Section III above, certain states (e.g., Pennsylvania) specify eligibility factors that are similar in
spirit but that avoid the use of vague terminology. Instead, such statutes specifically limit capital eligibility to
instances of torture. We continue to include these states in the estimation for the purposes of this specification
check. There are two additional states, Arkansas and Wyoming, that include the vague terms in their statutes (e.g.,
specially cruel or depraved), but that subsequently define those terms (in the statute) to pertain to instances of
33
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adoption of child murder eligibility laws by this more limited set of states continues to be associated
with an approximately 20% reduction in the rate of homicides with victims under the age of 15.
We also estimate substantially similar or virtually identical results when we calculate child
homicide rates using the weights provided by the SHR to ensure that the SHR homicide counts match
those of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (Panel E), include state-year robbery rates and state-year
general homicide rates (e.g., adult homicide rates) as measures to control for prevailing violent-crime
levels (Panel F), and estimate the child murder specification using only those states that have executed
at least one person in the post-moratorium period (Panel G). Moreover, in Panel H, we demonstrate the
robustness of the findings to the inclusion of those several states that impose two-tiered eligibility
criteria, where we calculate the relevant eligibility variables based solely on the restrictions imposed by
the respective definition of capital murder(as opposed to the separate delineation of aggravating
circumstances). To address the potential relationship between infant homicides and prevailing abortion
rates (Kalist and Molinari, 2006), we likewise demonstrate the robustness of the primary results to the
inclusion of such rates (Panel I).34
The primary specifications include controls for expenditures on police operations and judicial
and prosecutorial operations. This data is derived from the Criminal Justice Expenditure and
Employment (CJEE) Extracts for the post-1981 period and from the CJEE Surveys for the pre-1981
period.35 To address potential comparability issues between these two data sources, we estimate a
modified specification that simply excludes these measures altogether (Panel J), generating nearly

torture or serious physical abuse. The estimation results remain largely unchanged when we also exclude these
two additional states.
34
Abortion data is obtained from the Guttmacher Institute and represents state-year legal abortion rates per 1,000
women aged 15–44 (by state of residence). The presented results use contemporaneous abortion rates. However,
the estimated coefficient of the child murder dummy is nearly identical when we include up to 4-year lags in the
abortion rates.
35
The CJEE Extract data is only available in the period after 1981. The CJEE Survey data was collected between
1971 and 1979 and in 1985. To estimate the missing 1980 and 1981 measures, we linearly interpolate data from
the 1979 and 1985 CJEE Surveys. Imperfect comparability between these data sources may contribute noise to the
estimates.
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identical results. The estimates also remain unchanged when we focus only on the post-1981 period
(not shown).36
C. Potentially-Death-Eligible Murders
We next evaluate whether the child murder results extend to the relationship between general
expansions in death penalty eligibility factors and potentially-death-eligible homicide rates. Described in
greater detail in Section V above, potentially-death-eligible homicides are those that exhibit
characteristics that would garner capital eligibility in at least one state. The resulting homicide rate is
thus constructed so as to avoid any noise associated with variations in the rate of homicides that are not
implicated by the capital eligibility statute of any state and that are consequently of an arguably nondeterrable nature.
Panel A of Table VIII presents results of specifications that parameterize variations in capital
eligibility using an incident-level database of homicides to simulate the percentage of national
potentially-death-eligible homicides that would be eligible for capital punishment based on the death
penalty statutes in operation for each state-year cell. In Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, we perform these
simulations using all possible eligibility factors, including the murder of youth victims. We estimate that
an increase from 0% to 100% in the percent of potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact
eligible for capital punishment in a given state is associated with a roughly 26% decline in the
36

Difference-in-difference specifications may still reflect a tendency to over-reject the null hypothesis of no-effect
when the number of analytical groups is fixed, even with standard-error adjustments for within-group
autocorrelation (Bertrand et al. 2004, Conley and Taber 2005). While the number of groups (i.e., states)
considered in the above analysis is large, we nonetheless perform hypothesis tests on the child murder eligibility
coefficient using a randomization inference approach (Duflo et al. 2005), which allows for valid inference using any
number of groups. Using only the set of states that did not amend their statutes to add child murder eligibility
over the sample period, we randomly generate (and assign) 5,000 sets of placebo laws and then estimate the
specification used in Column 1 of Table III on each of these simulated sets of laws. We simulate the placebo set so
that the expected distribution of placebo law changes over time matches the distribution of the child murder law
changes that actually took place (Gruber and Hungerman 2008). We find that the child murder coefficient from
the primary difference-in-difference specification estimated above (using actual variation in eligibility laws) is in
st
the 2.1 percentile of the empirical distribution of the 5000 estimated coefficient means from the above
simulations. This placement corresponds to a p-value of roughly 0.04 and is thus consistent with a 5% significance
level. This exercise provides additional confidence in the conclusion that the estimated deterrent effect of child
murder eligibility expansions would likely not be observed if the true effect were zero.
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potentially-death-eligible homicide rate (or an average annual reduction of roughly 33 such homicides).
While this estimate is rather imprecise and statistically insignificant, it corresponds rather closely with
the magnitude of the deterrence estimates derived in the above child murder specifications, where the
most direct comparison is arguably with the 31% decline in child murder rates identified in Table IV,
which parameterizes variations in child murder eligibility laws through an analogous simulation exercise.
In Column 2 of Panel A, we test for pre-adoption trends and estimate a positive, statistically-insignificant
coefficient for the 2-year lead indicator variable, suggesting that the negative homicide-rate differential
between treatment and control states did not begin in the period prior to the expansion of eligibility
statutes (while a positive differential may have preceded the statutory expansions).
Having already considered the relationship between child murder eligibility provisions and child
murder rates, we remove the child murder eligibility factor from the simulation analysis in Columns 3
and 4 of Panel A. Focusing solely on the relationship between homicide rates and the scope of the
remaining factors, we now estimate a coefficient for the simulated eligibility variable that is nearly 0 in
magnitude. These findings thus do not appear to offer evidence in support of an extension of the above
child murder results to general eligibility factors. However, by removing the child murder eligibility
factor, we have removed a substantial portion of the variation in eligibility laws, leaving results that are
quite noisy and limiting the ability to make inferences regarding a more general effect. Moreover, this
exercise explores the general impact of eligibility expansions, essentially treating all non-child-murder
factors alike. However, it remains possible that certain specific expansions have independent deterrent
effects. While we may have few treatment states with which to test for any independent effects of the
remaining factors, we do consider certain additional difference-in-difference specifications in subsection D below, taking care to address any family-wise-error concerns.
Over the length of the sample period, the vast bulk of the variation in capital punishment
statutes is represented by expansions of pre-existing statutes. However, several states, including New
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York, did wait well into the post-moratorium period and thus well into the sample period before
reinstating their general death penalty statutes. While statutory reinstatements of the death penalty do
represent an increase in the number of homicides that are eligible for capital punishment, there is a
reasonable possibility that the presence of a capital punishment statute has a deterrent impact
independent of the reach of such a statute. For this reason, we separate these two elements to the
variation in capital punishment statutes. To allow for a clean analysis of eligibility expansions, we focus
in Panel A of Table VIII solely on expansions of existing statutes and thus drop those state-year cells in
which the relevant death penalty state had yet to enact a post-moratorium death penalty statute.
We do not attempt to estimate the separate effect of statutory reinstatements and subsequent
statutory expansions in the same specification given that reinstatements necessarily occur at the same
time that the affected states expand the number of homicides that are eligible for the death penalty.
Nonetheless, in Table IX, we estimate specifications that focus solely on the coefficient of the general
death penalty statute variable. Given that such specifications no longer include the simulated eligibility
percentage measure, we now include those several states that were dropped from the above analysis
due to the two-tiered nature of their eligibility process (though the results are similar excluding such
states).37 In Column 1, we estimate a large, statistically-significant relationship between homicide rates
and the reinstatement of a death penalty statute, with a coefficient of -0.35 (implying an annual
reduction of approximately 45 lives). The extent of this estimate suggests that the act of reinstating a
death penalty statute may have a large saliency effect that is independent of the scope of that statute.
However, the positive coefficient estimated for the lead indicator variable in Column 2 is large enough
to suggest that the estimated magnitude of this reinstatement effect may be confounded by legislative
endogeneity concerns.
37

Nonetheless, we continue to exclude Kansas from the specification. While Kansas did reinstate the death
penalty in 1994, Kansas homicide records are missing from the SHR files between 1993 and 1999. However, when
we include Kansas and rely only on its post-reinstatement homicide records from 2000 – 2004, we estimate
substantially similar coefficients for the general death penalty variable.

36

Of course, the substantial reduction in homicide rates estimated for those several reinstatement
states may actually arise from a pure expansion effect (and not from any such independent
reinstatement effect) that happens to be of significant magnitude for this small set of states. With this
possibility in mind, in Panel B of Table VIII, we estimate the same specifications considered in Panel A,
but include the pre-reinstatement years for the relevant set of reinstatement states (e.g., New York). In
such states, the simulated eligibility percentage jumps from a value of 0 to the proper percentage upon
reinstatement. In each such specification, we estimate a large negative association between homicide
rates and expansions in capital punishment eligibility.
The mixed findings of the general eligibility-expansion specifications stand in contrast with the
robust deterrence findings of the child murder specifications. This discrepancy may be attributable to
several factors. First, by using total homicide rates and a general parameterization of eligibility factors,
the general simulation specification inherently puts different types of homicides and different eligibility
criteria on equal footing. However, the effect of adding eligibility for child murder, for instance, may
differ from the effect of adding eligibility for narcotics-related homicides. Child murderers may simply
perceive and respond to punitive risks in an entirely different manner. Moreover, prosecutors may elect
to embrace the bargaining potential of capital eligibility in the case of child murderers to a different
extent than they would in the case of other eligible murderers.
Second, the divergent findings between the child murder eligibility model and the general
simulated eligibility model may be due to certain other methodological limitations of the latter model.
The inability of the SHR records to identify all instances in which homicides meet eligibility standards
may lead to measurement error in the simulated eligibility measures. Moreover, each of the statutory
amendments that drive the variation in the simulated eligibility probabilities are themselves only
targeted at specific types of crimes. For instance, an amendment adding narcotics-related homicides to
the list of eligibility factors may only lead to deterrence in homicidal behavior of this nature, depending
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on the channels by which these rules affect the criminal mind. However, our model necessarily
estimates the impact of such an expansion on a more broadly-defined homicide rate. While the
tractability of the general simulation specification requires the use of a broad homicide definition, the
fact that identification in this model results from staggered eligibility amendments of a distinct, limited
nature may make it difficult to isolate the true deterrent forces in play. The child murder model, on the
other hand, may simply provide for a more powerful statistical approach by targeting both the
legislative variation and the dependent variable on the same subset of homicidal behavior.
D. Multiple-Outcome Tests
The above analysis focuses largely on an examination of one specific type of eligibility expansion
– i.e., child murders. The analysis, however, does draw (albeit in a more generalized manner) on
expansions of additional eligibility types, possibly implicating family-wise error concerns in that we
emphasize standard hypothesis tests on the child murder regression coefficients without correcting the
relevant standard errors for the possibility that the child murder outcome is indeed part of a family of
hypotheses – i.e., a family of separate examinations of the impact of each eligibility type.38 To address
possible family-wise error concerns, researchers often adjust the critical values for each separate
hypothesis test in such a fashion that there is a less than 0.05 chance that at least one of the individual
tests in the family would exceed the adjusted critical value (Duflo et al., 2005).
Standard error corrections accounting for family-wise error, however, may not be appropriate in
the present context, in that we are not estimating the impact of the same natural experiment on a
multitude of outcomes. Rather, with each different eligibility type comes an entirely different set of
legislative variation. We emphasize the child murder specification in that it presents the richest set of
variations, with at least 16 treatment groups (depending on the specification) and with adoption years
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The essence of this concern is that, if we test a policy reform on numerous outcomes and consider separate
hypothesis tests on each outcome, there may reasonably be a greater than 0.05 chance that we reject at least one
of those individual tests (based on an individual 95% confidence interval).
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staggered over a long horizon. Most of the remaining expansion types occur across 1 – 4 treatment
groups only. As indicated above, difference-in-difference specifications with few treatment groups may
implicate concerns regarding the consistency of the estimated coefficients and the appropriateness of
the estimated standard errors (Conley and Taber, 2005). Focusing on the child murder specification for
these reasons, we elect to perform our primary inference on the child murder results under standard
one-outcome methods. Moreover, this individual-outcome approach may be appropriate to those who
are solely interested in evaluating the impact of child murder eligibility (e.g., policymakers who, for
other reasons, desire only to extend capital eligibility to this class).
In any event, we also demonstrate the robustness of the child murder results to a standard,
conservative adjustment in the estimated p-values for possible family-wise error. In Table X, we expand
the individual child murder investigation to consider the separate impact of several of the next most
relevant expansions and present the results of 4 separate difference-in-difference regressions. Each
regression evaluates the impact of a particular type of eligibility provision (child murder, multiple-victim
murder, narcotics-related murder and elderly murder) on the appropriate homicide rate.39 The final row
in each panel of Table X presents a Bonferroni-adjusted p-value for the coefficient of the relevant
eligibility dummy. With a Bonferroni adjustment (Savin, 1984), the p-value is simply multiplied by the
number of tests in the family (in this instance 4). With a stand-alone p-value of less than 1/1000, the
child murder estimates continue to be significant at 1% after correcting for any family-wise error in this
4-outcome investigation. With this initial p-value, the same would likely hold even it were to possible to
estimate reliable results for each of the remaining expansion types.
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For the multiple-victim specifications, we use a general homicide rate (potentially-death-eligible homicide rate)
as the dependent variable, capturing the possibility that such provisions also impact the incentives to commit
homicides in the first instance (acknowledging that individuals may have a stronger incentive to commit additional
murders to cover up an initial murder). However, we estimate similar relationships using alternative variables that
capture the rate of multiple-victim homicides themselves. In the case of the elderly murder specifications, we base
the dependent variable on the rate of homicide of victims older than 70.
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The results presented in Table X also demonstrate a negative association between homicide
rates and multiple-victim eligibility adoptions. This specific result, however, is not robust to the
Bonferroni adjustment. We also estimate a positive, insignificant relationship between narcotics-related
homicides and narcotics-related eligibility laws and between homicides of elderly victims and associated
elderly homicide rates.40
This multiple-outcomes framework allows us to perform more conservative inference on the
specific child murder estimates. However, since the Bonferroni-adjusted critical values are set so that
there is a less than 0.05 probability of estimating a significant coefficient in at least one of the outcomes,
this framework, at the same time, allows us to evaluate a more general hypothesis – i.e., a joint null
hypothesis of zero effects across all outcomes. Thus, the robustness of the child murder coefficients to
the Bonferroni adjustment suggests that we can reject this joint null hypothesis and infer that eligibility
expansions may be associated with reduced homicide rates on at least some level.41
There are of, course, alternative general hypotheses that may be of interest. For instance, one
may want to test the null hypothesis of a zero average treatment effect across the different outcome
specifications (as distinct from testing a null hypothesis of zero effects in every instance). Researchers
interested in testing for more general effects of this nature sometimes consider the following approach:
(1) estimate the treatment effects from each separate outcomes specification, (2) calculate a weighted
average of these separate point estimates and (3) conduct inference on this average treatment effect
measure (Duflo et al., 2005). The general simulated eligibility exercise considered above is very much in
this spirit, although it operates by combining different types of legislative variation into one specification
rather than by combining separately estimated treatment effects. This simulation exercise nonetheless
40

In unreported regressions, we include lead indicator variables in these specifications. The results from that
modification suggest that the positive coefficient estimated for the narcotics specification appears to be reflective
of a positive trend that emerged prior to the adoption of the narcotics-related eligibility factor.
41
We also consider a similar hypothesis test in which we estimate these 4 specifications in a seemingly unrelated
regression and then consider an F-test of zero effects across all 4 eligibility coefficients. We reject this hypothesis
at 1%.
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achieves the same function of confronting family-wise error concerns while allowing for a more general
evaluation of the relationship between homicide rates and the propensity of a state to extend capital
eligibility to a given homicide.
VII.

Conclusion

Drawing on a rich set of legislative variation, we have found evidence to suggest that extending
eligibility for capital punishment to the murder of youth victims is associated with an approximately 20%
reduction in the homicide rate of youth victims, corresponding to close to 4 fewer child homicides
annually in a state of average size. We have considered certain falsification exercises that ease (without
eliminating) concerns that these results are merely reflective of contemporaneous crime-fighting
movements of another nature. The analysis is limited, however, by an inability to ease concerns
regarding spurious correlations resulting from contemporaneous "get-tough-on-crime" movements that
target child victims.
Eligibility expansions may induce a deterrence response either by paving the way for ultimate
executions or by providing prosecutors with enhanced bargaining leverage. While the former channel
may only materialize on rare occasions, capital eligibility itself is triggered quite frequently, in which
event the threat of its application may impact a relatively large number of plea-bargaining outcomes.
The plausibility of these sizeable findings may rest on the strength by which prosecutors embrace this
bargaining tool and on the degree to which potential offenders are, in fact, responsive to observed
variations in punishment levels.
While confining the estimation to the case of child murder leads to certain methodological
advantages, one should be cautious in viewing the child murder model as representative of a general
deterrent effect. When we turn to the estimation of a model that draws on a broader range of
eligibility expansions, we continue to estimate regression coefficients of the same sign and of
comparable magnitude. These findings, however, are sensitive to the exclusion of the child murder
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factor from the general eligibility analysis. Thus, with relatively noisy and mixed findings, the results
provide little indication that the more targeted findings of the child murder specification will extend to
expansions in eligibility criteria of other kinds.
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Table I: Expansions of Death Penalty Statutes to Include Murders of Youth Victims
Year of
Adoption

Operable Age
Cut-off*

Mississippi**

1983

"child"

Arizona

1985

15

Louisiana

1986

12

South Carolina

1986

12

Indiana

1987

12

Wyoming

1989

17

Pennsylvania

1990

12

Alabama**

1992

14

Colorado

1994

12

Texas

1994

6

Delaware

1995

15

New Jersey

1995

14

Connecticut**

1996

16

Florida***

1996

12

Nevada

1996

14

South Dakota

1996

13

Ohio

1998

13

Oregon

1998

14

Virginia

1998

14

Arkansas

2001

13

State

* Homicides of victims below the indicated age are eligible for capital punishment in the relevant
state (post-reform). We assume a cut-off of 16 for those specifications that include Mississippi,
which extends eligibility to instances of deaths resulting from the abuse of a child and where
subsequent case law has verified that this provision is triggered by the killing of a child by any
means. See, e.g., Stevens v. State, 806 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 2001).
**These states effectively place different sets of restrictions on capital eligibility in both the
definition of capital murder and the list of aggravating circumstances to consider during
sentencing. We exclude these states from our preferred specifications given the difficulty in
determining how these dual sets of restrictions interact with each other.
*** Florida is only represented in the SHR prior to 1996.
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Table II: Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables
Variable
Child Murder Eligibility Law Dummy
Simulated Percentage of Child Murders (under 17 years old) Eligible for Death
Penalty
Simulated Percentage of “Potentially-Death-Eligible” Murders Eligible for Death
Penalty
Simulated Percentage of “Potentially-Death-Eligible” Murders Eligible for Death
Penalty (excluding child murder factor from simulation and murder-rate
calculation)

Mean
(standard deviation)
0.23
(0.42)
0.13
(0.24)
0.47
(0.25)
0.50
(0.27)

Homicide Rate: victim age < 15 years old (per 100,000 people < 15 years old)

1.63
(0.63)

Homicide Rate: victim age < 5 years old (per 100,000 people < 5 years old)

3.13
(1.26)

Homicide Rate: victim age < 10 years old (per 100,000 people < 10 years old)

1.93
(0.74)

Homicide Rate: victim age >= 20 years old (per 100,000 people >= 20 years old)

8.46
(4.08)

Homicide Rate: “potentially-death-eligible” homicides (per 100,000 people)

2.43
(1.28)

Homicide Rate: “potentially-death-eligible” homicides (excluding child murder
factor, per 100,000 people)

2.19
(1.23)

1977 – 2004 homicide data is from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Supplementary Homicide Reports
(SHR). Homicide rates are calculated at the state-year level and are derived from a national sample of
homicides, with an average annual sample size of roughly 17,000. Homicides are excluded from the
calculation where the offender is under 16 years of age. Reported statistics are then presented for a sample
of 1154 state-year cells, weighted by the total population of the relevant state and year. The sample excludes
states that effectively impose a two-tiered eligibility process. The sample excludes state-year cells during
which the relevant portions of the death penalty statutes were deemed unconstitutional or during which the
constitutionality of such provisions was uncertain. Denominators used for the age-specific homicide rates are
based on the population within the relevant age group. Denominators used for “potentially-death-eligible”
homicide rates are based on total population counts for the relevant state and year.
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Table III: The Relationship Between Child Murder Eligibility Provisions and Murder Rates of Child Victims
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-

-

0.029
(0.084)

0.053
(0.069)

0.104
(0.074)

-

-

-0.200**
(0.047)

-0.212**
(0.053)

-0.243**
(0.084)

-0.234**
(0.073)

-0.205*
(0.082)

-0.183**
(0.051)

-0.170**
(0.055)

2-Year Lead

-

0.019
(0.065)

0.039
(0.092)

0.032
(0.080)

0.042
(0.079)

-

-

3-Year Lead

-

-

0.030
(0.109)

0.036
(0.110)

0.035
(0.108)

-

-

4-Year Lead

-

-

0.030
(0.084)

0.043
(0.080)

0.039
(0.083)

-

-

5-Year Lead

-

-

-0.134
(0.096)

-0.134
(0.094)

-0.147
(0.094)

-

-

6-Year Lead

-

-

-0.013
(0.086)

-

-

YES
YES
0.54
1062

YES
YES
0.54
1062

-0.012
-0.023
(0.082)
(0.079)
Under 15 Years Old
YES
YES
YES
NO
0.55
0.50
1010
1010

Under 5
YES
YES
0.45
1062

Under 10
YES
YES
0.47
1035

Coefficient of Child Murder Eligibility Law Dummy
2-Year Lag
Contemporaneous

Relevant Homicide Rate (logged)
State-Year Controls?
State-Specific Linear Trends?
2
R
N

NO
NO
0.49
1010

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of the log of the indicated state-year homicide rate on a dummy variable for the
presence of a law extending capital eligibility to child murders. Each regression also includes various state-year controls (except Column 5), state-specific
linear trends (except Columns 4 and 5), and a measure capturing the scope of the remaining eligibility provisions: the percentage of national potentiallydeath-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital punishment based on the relevant state-year eligibility laws (coefficients omitted above).
Columns 2 – 5 include certain leads and lags of the child murder law dummy, where an x-year lead variable indicates at time t the status of a state’s child
murder eligibility law at time t+x (capturing an effect that pre-dates adoption) and where an x-year lag indicates the status of a state’s child murder eligibility
law at time t-x. Column 7 excludes Texas (the one state with an age cut-off under 10 years old) from the specification. Regressions are weighted by the
relevant population count used in the homicide-rate calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.

Table IV: The Relationship Between Murder Rates of Victims Under 15 Years Old and the
Simulated Percentage of Child Murders Eligible for the Death Penalty
(1)

(2)

-0.309**
(0.091)

-0.338**
(0.098)

-

0.048
(0.114)

-0.035
(0.285)

-0.034
(0.285)

0.54
1062

0.54
1062

Coefficient of Simulated Child Murder Eligibility Percentage:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
Coefficient of General Simulated Eligibility Percentage
(excluding child murders)
2

R
N

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the
error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of
the log of the state-year homicide rate of victims under 15 years old on a variable capturing the percentage of
national homicides of victims under the age of 17 that are eligible for capital punishment based on the
eligibility laws for the relevant state-year cell. The estimated specifications also include a measure of the
percentage of national potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital punishment
based on the relevant state-year eligibility laws for the remaining eligibility factors. Each specification
includes various state-year controls along with a set of state-specific linear time trends. Column 2 includes a
2-year lead dummy variable for the adoption of child murder eligibility provisions. Regressions are weighted
by the under-15 population count used in the homicide-rate calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.

46

Table V: The Relationship Between Murder Rates of Victims Under 15 Years Old and the
Enactment of General Death Penalty Statutes and Child Murder Eligibility Provisions
(1)

(2)

-0.328
(0.169)

-0.457*
(0.184)

-

0.190**
(0.058)

-0.195**
(0.047)

-0.204**
(0.053)

-

0.020
(0.064)

0.003
(0.247)

-0.002
(0.243)

0.55
1088

0.55
1088

Coefficient of General Death Penalty Enactment Dummy:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
Coefficient of Child Murder Eligibility Law Dummy
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
Coefficient of Simulated Eligibility Percentage (excluding
child murders)
2

R
N

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the
error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of
the log of the state-year homicide rate of victims under 15 years old on dummy variables for the presence of a
general death penalty law and a law specifically extending capital eligibility to child murders, along with a
measure of the percentage of national potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital
punishment based on the relevant state-year eligibility laws for the remaining eligibility factors. Each
specification includes various state-year controls along with a set of state-specific linear time trends. Column
2 includes 2-year lead dummy variables for general death penalty laws and child murder eligibility provisions.
Regressions are weighted by the under-15 population count used in the homicide-rate calculation. Homicide
data is from the SHR.
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Table VI: The Relationship Between Child Murder Eligibility Provisions and Homicide Rates of
Victims Over 20 Years Old (Falsification Test)
(1)

(2)

-0.043
(0.042)

0.007
(0.044)

-

-0.080*
(0.031)

0.001**

0.001**

-

0.131

0.93
1062

0.93
1062

Coefficient of Child Murder Eligibility Law Dummy:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
P-value of significance test of difference in
estimated coefficients between under-15
specification and over-20 specification:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
2

R
N

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the
error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of
the log of the state-year homicide rate of victims over 20 years old on a dummy variable for the presence of a
law specifically extending capital eligibility to child murders, along with a measure of the percentage of
national potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital punishment based on the
relevant state-year eligibility laws for the remaining eligibility factors. Each specification includes various
state-year controls along with a set of state-specific linear time trends. Column 2 includes a 2-year lead
dummy variable for the child murder eligibility law. Also presented are p-values of significance tests
comparing the respective coefficients from the over-20 specifications to those from the analogous under-15
specifications (where the relevant F-tests are performed following the estimation of seemingly-unrelated
regressions). Regressions are weighted by the over-20 population count used in the homicide-rate
calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.
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Table VII: Various Sensitivity Tests. The Relationship Between Child Murder Eligibility Provisions
and Homicide Rates of Victims Under 15 Years Old
Coefficient of Child Murder
Eligibility Law Dummy
Panel A: Excluding state-specific linear time trends

-0.174**
(0.039)

Panel B: Including state-specific linear and quadratic time trends

-0.168*
(0.076)

Panel C: Excluding control variable for the scope of the remaining eligibility
provisions (simulated eligibility percentage based on non-child-murder factors)

-0.199**
(0.487)

Panel D: Excluding treatment states with existing eligibility provisions covering
actions of a heinous, atrocious or cruel nature (or similar provision)

-0.202**
(0.054)

Panel E: Using weights provided by the SHR to ensure that the SHR homicide
counts match those of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports

-0.201**
(0.047)

Panel F: Including state-year robbery rates and over-20 homicide rates to
control for prevailing violent-crime levels

-0.168**
(0.046)

Panel G: Excluding treatment states that have not executed anyone in the postmoratorium period

-0.191**
(0.049)

Panel H: Include states that impose two-tiered eligibility criteria (basing
eligibility only on restrictions imposed by relevant definition of capital murder)

-0.148*
(0.056)

Panel I: Include state-year legal abortion rates per 1,000 women aged 15–44 (by
state of residence)

-0.198**
(0.048)

Panel J: Excluding controls for police and judicial-legal expenses

-0.202**
(0.047)

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error
term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of the log of
the state-year homicide rate of victims under 15 years old on a dummy variable for the presence of a law extending
capital eligibility to child murders. Each regression also includes various state-year controls, state-specific linear
trends (except Panel A), and a measure capturing the scope of the remaining eligibility provisions: the percentage
of national potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital punishment based on the
relevant state-year eligibility laws (except for Panel C). Each Panel modifies the basic child murder specification as
indicated. Regressions are weighted by the relevant population count used in the homicide-rate calculation.
Homicide data is from the SHR.
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Table VIII: The Relationship Between Potentially-Death-Eligible Homicide Rates and Simulated
Eligibility Percentages
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.261
(0.222)

-0.316
(0.229)

-0.007
(0.248)

-0.132
(0.275)

-

0.139
(0.333)

-

0.350
(0.412)

1123

1123

1123

1123

-0.536**
(0.130)

-0.595**
(0.149)

-0.416**
(0.113)

-0.518**
(0.122)

-

0.150
(0.210)

-

0.227
(0.174)

1153

1153

1153

1153

Panel A: Excluding expansions associated
with general death penalty reinstatements
Coefficient of Simulated Eligibility
Percentage:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
N
Panel B: Including expansions associated
with general death penalty reinstatements
Coefficient of Simulated Eligibility
Percentage:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
N
Eligibility factors considered in eligibility
simulations and in potentially-death-eligible
homicide rate calculation?

All eligibility factors

All eligibility factors other than
child murder

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error
term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of the log
of the state-year potentially-death-eligible homicide rate on a measure representing the percentage of national
potentially-death-eligible homicides that are in fact eligible for capital punishment based on the relevant stateyear eligibility laws. Potentially-death-eligible homicide rates represent the rate of homicides with characteristics
that trigger eligibility in at least one state. Each specification includes various state-year controls along with a set
of state-specific linear time trends. Columns 3 and 4 exclude the child murder factor from both the calculation of
potentially-death-eligible homicide rates and from the calculation of the simulated eligibility percentage.
Columns 2 and 4 include a 2-year lead eligibility percentage variable that equals at time t the state’s simulated
eligibility percentage at time t+2 (capturing a change in eligibility laws prior to their occurrence). Regressions are
weighted by the total population count used in the homicide-rate calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.
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Table IX: The Relationship Between Potentially-Death-Eligible Homicide Rates and the
Enactment of General Death Penalty Statutes
(1)

(2)

-0.349**
(0.056)

-0.492**
(0.079)

-

0.203*
(0.097)

0.83
1260

0.83
1260

Coefficient of General Death Penalty Enactment
Dummy:
Contemporaneous
2-Year Lead
2

R
N

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the
error term are reported in parentheses. Reported coefficients are from difference-in-difference regressions of
the log of the state-year potentially-death-eligible homicide rate on a dummy variable for the presence of a
general death penalty statute. Potentially-death-eligible homicide rates represent the rate of homicides with
characteristics that trigger eligibility in at least one state. Each specification includes various state-year controls
along with a set of state-specific linear time trends. Column 2 includes a 2-year lead indicator variable for a
state’s general death penalty laws. Regressions are weighted by the total population count used in the
homicide-rate calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.
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Table X: The Relationship Between Various Homicide Rates and the Enactment of Specific Death Penalty Expansions
Eligibility Factor

Homicide Rate

Coefficient of Relevant Eligibility Law Dummy

Panel A: Child Murder (replicating
Table VII, Panel B)

Under-15 (logged)

Child murder eligibility dummy

Panel B: Multiple-Victim Murder

Potentially Death Eligible
(logged)

Bonferroni-adjusted p-value

0.00**

Multiple-victim eligibility dummy

-0.152*
(0.068)

Bonferroni-adjusted p-value
Panel C: Narcotics-Related Murder

Narcotics-related (logged)

Narcotics-related eligibility dummy
Bonferroni-adjusted p-value

Panel D: Elderly Murder

Over-70 (logged)

-0.199**
(0.049)

Elderly murder eligibility dummy
Bonferroni-adjusted p-value

0.12
0.286
(0.567)
1.00
0.158
(0.106)
0.56

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors corrected for within-state correlation in the error term are reported in parentheses.
Bonferroni-adjusted p-values are indicated in each panel, representing the product of the p-value for the relevant eligibility law estimate and the
number of outcomes considered. Reported coefficients are from separate difference-in-difference regressions of the log of the indicated homicide
rate on a dummy variable for the capital eligibility factor indicated in the first column. Each specification includes various state-year controls along
with a set of state-specific linear time trends. The specifications do not include controls for the scope of the remaining eligibility provisions.
Regressions are weighted by the total population count used in the homicide-rate calculation. Homicide data is from the SHR.
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